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Abstract
Suppressing stereotypes often results in more stereotype use, an effect attributed to heightened stereotype activation. The
authors report two experiments examining the consequences of suppression on two self-relevant outcomes: the active self-
concept and overt behavior. Participants who suppressed stereotypes incorporated stereotypic traits into their self-concepts and
demonstrated stereotype-congruent behavior compared to those who were exposed to the same stereotypes but did not sup-
press them. These findings address issues emerging from current theories of suppression, priming, and the active self.
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The capacity to control one’s conscious thoughts is vital for
everyday human functioning. The ability to focus attention
on the task at hand while ignoring unwanted distractions allows
people to achieve their goals. However, research indicates that
thought suppression can lead to unintended outcomes. Wegner,
Schneider, Carter, and White (1987; for a review, see Wegner,
1994) first established a rebound effect when they found that
participants who suppressed thoughts of a white bear later
experienced increases in white bear thoughts. Thus, suppres-
sing thoughts of a concept led to a ‘‘rebound’’ in the concept’s
accessibility once suppression had ended.
Rebound effects have been demonstrated following suppres-
sion of various concepts, including traits (Newman, Duff, &
Baumeister, 1997; Newman, Duff, Hedberg, & Blitstein,
1996) and stereotypes (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne,
1998; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Wyer,
2007; Wyer, Sherman, & Stroessner, 1998, 2000). Recently
suppressed traits or stereotypes become mentally accessible
and are used in judging others and interpreting others’ beha-
vior. In this article, we report two experiments that examine
consequences of post-suppression stereotype rebound on two
self-relevant outcomes: the active self-concept and overt
behavior.
Mechanisms of Postsuppression Rebound
Various models have been proposed to account for postsuppres-
sion rebound effects. Wegner’s (1994) ironic process model
posits that rebound effects result from the coaction of two inter-
linked cognitive processes. The automatic monitoring process
scans consciousness for instances of the to-be-suppressed
thought. When an occurrence is detected, the controlled operat-
ing process seeks appropriate substitutes for the unwanted
thought. However, the operating process requires motivation and
cognitive capacity and is therefore vulnerable todisruption.When
that occurs, the heightened sensitivity caused by the monitoring
process allows the now hyper-accessible thought to reach con-
sciousness at levels greater than would have occurred without
suppression. Alternative models suggest that metacognitive pro-
cesses contribute to postsuppression rebound. For example, Lib-
erman and Forster (2000) suggest that individuals infer goals to
use a concept from difficulties or failures experienced while sup-
pressing it. The concept remains activated in memory until those
goals are met (by expressing the concept).
Thus, either directly or indirectly, postsuppression rebound
is believed to result from the unintentional activation of a sup-
pressed concept. In this regard, suppression has been likened to
priming (i.e., direct activation of a concept). Indeed, many
manifestations of postsuppression rebound parallel the effects
of priming manipulations. In particular, both priming and sup-
pression are known to bias judgments of others toward the
primed or suppressed concept (e.g., both priming [Devine,
1989] and suppressing [Wyer et al., 1998, 2000] African
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American stereotypes lead to greater stereotype use when
judging others).
Although it might be tempting to equate the effect of
thought suppression with the effect of priming, as both increase
concept activation, the two should be kept quite distinct. Unlike
priming, suppression is a self-regulatory activity (Gailliot,
Plant, Butz, & Baumeister, 2007); it may be resource depleting
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) and may involve increased
attention to the self (Carver & Scheier, 1981). These character-
istics suggest that suppression may lead to greater assimilation
than priming to the extent that cognitive resources are wea-
kened but less assimilation than priming to the extent that
self-awareness is enhanced (Wheeler, Morrison, DeMarree,
& Petty, 2008). Thus, although suppression and priming both
produce concept activation, the differences between them war-
rant an independent investigation of how suppression affects
self-relevant outcomes. This is the object of the present article.
Suppression and Self
No previous work has explored whether suppression of self-
relevant thoughts affects self-relevant outcomes in the normal
population. However, an extensive literature has shown that
in psychological disorders (e.g., depression and anxiety) sup-
pressing personally intrusive thoughts contributes to a disor-
dered sense of self—obsessive, traumatic, or self-defeating
thoughts are suppressed only to return later, often with greater
frequency (for a review, see Purdon, 1999).
Thought suppression is also common in normal individuals.
One may elect to avoid thinking about concepts that have little
personal relevance. For example, when interviewing candi-
dates for a job, an employer may choose to avoid thinking
about out-group stereotypes. When greeting someone in a
wheelchair, one may strive to avoid thinking about the person’s
disability. Research has established that suppression in such
scenarios increases the chances of applying the suppressed con-
cept to others (Macrae et al., 1994; Wyer et al., 1998, 2000). In
contrast, little is understood about how suppressing personally
nonrelevant thoughts might influence the self.
Insight into this possibility may be gleaned from the now-
extensive literature on how priming affects the self. The
active-self account (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007) sug-
gests that priming produces changes in the ‘‘active’’ self-
concept (i.e., those aspects of the self-concept that are currently
accessible). The active self is fluid, shifting in response to
external cues that make certain information more accessible.
According to the active-self account, assimilation to a prime
occurs either by selectively activating prime-consistent ele-
ments of the self-concept or by introducing prime-consistent
elements that can be incorporated within the self-concept (for
an alternative account, see Mussweiler, 2007). Supporting this
view, DeMarree and colleagues (DeMarree & Loersch, 2009;
DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005) reported that priming
produces assimilation in self-judgments.
Two experiments test the hypothesis that suppressing (non-
self-relevant) stereotypes affects self-relevant outcomes. We
first examine whether stereotype suppression produces
stereotype-congruent changes in the active self-concept
(Wheeler et al., 2007). Next, we explore whether stereotype
suppression also produces stereotype-congruent changes in
overt behavior.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested the effects of suppressing occupational
stereotypes on the active self-concept. Participants suppressed
stereotypes of inventors (stereotypically associated with crea-
tivity) or mathematicians (stereotypically associated with
logic). If suppression leads people to assimilate the active
self-concept to the stereotype, then participants who suppress
stereotypes of inventors should view themselves as more crea-
tive, whereas those who suppress stereotypes of mathemati-
cians should view themselves as more logical.
Because our sample comprised university students who
have well-established beliefs about their cognitive skills (e.g.,
how logical or creative they are), we examined both explicit
and implicit measures of self-concept. Although explicit mea-
sures may be impervious to manipulation (drawing on well-
rehearsed beliefs about the self), implicit measures may reflect
shifts in the accessibility of specific aspects of self-knowledge.
If suppressing stereotypes activates a biased (stereotype-
consistent) subset of participants’ self-knowledge (e.g., times
they displayed creativity or logic), we should expect a strength-
ening of associations between the self and those attributes. Thus,
participants reported their (explicit) self-perceptions of creativity
and logic and completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT) that
assessed their self-logic and self-creativity associations.
Method
Pretest. A separate sample of 20 participants rated occupa-
tional groups (including inventors and mathematicians) on
traits (including creative and logical) using 1 to 10 scales (not
at all to very strongly associated with the group). Participants
viewed inventors as more creative (M ¼ 9.65, s ¼ 0.81 ) than
logical (M ¼ 7.80, s ¼ 2.76), t(19) ¼ 2.85, p ¼ .01, d ¼ 1.31,
but mathematicians as more logical (M ¼ 9.25, s ¼ 1.80) than
creative (M ¼ 6.00, s ¼ 2.64), t(19) ¼ 5.01, p < .001, d ¼ 2.30.
They rated inventors as more creative than mathematicians,
t(19) ¼ 6.05, p < .001, d ¼ 2.78, but mathematicians as more
logical than inventors, t(19) ¼ 3.18, p ¼ .005, d ¼ 1.46. Thus,
the traits ‘‘logical’’ and ‘‘creative’’ appear to be particularly
and uniquely strong associates of mathematicians and
inventors, respectively.
Participants and design. Eighty undergraduate psychology
students (84% female, Mage ¼ 20.5 years) were randomly
assigned to conditions of a 2 (instructions: suppress vs.
describe)  2 (group: mathematicians vs. inventors) between-
participants design.
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Procedure. The experiment included two phases, which
participants believed were unrelated studies. Instructions for
both phases were provided via computer. First, participants
were given 5 minutes to write a description of a specified
occupational group (mathematicians or inventors) as part of
an ‘‘occupational perception study.’’ Half of the participants
in each group condition were instructed to avoid thinking about
or using occupational stereotypes in their descriptions.
The second phase included two measures of self-concept.
First, participants rated themselves on 20 personality traits,
including creativity-related traits (creative, imaginative, inno-
vative, original, inspired; a ¼ .74), logic-related traits (logical,
rational, sensible, reasonable, calculating; a ¼ .65), and
stereotype-unrelated traits (friendly, sociable, fun loving,
extraverted, outgoing, polite, considerate, caring, compassio-
nate, thoughtful). Ratings were made on 9-point scales (1¼ not
at all like me, 9 ¼ very much like me).
Next, participants completed an IAT (Greenwald, McGhee,
& Schwartz, 1998) that included seven blocks of trials. On each
block, they classified words on one or more dimensions by
pressing a left-hand or right-hand response key as quickly as
possible, according to category labels appearing at the top of
the screen. Personal pronouns (I, me, self, my, mine, he, she,
it, they, them) were classified as ‘‘self’’ versus ‘‘other’’ and
adjectives (creative, imaginative, innovative, original,
inspired, logical, rational, sensible, reasonable, calculating)
were classified as ‘‘creative’’ versus ‘‘logical.’’ Procedural
details of the IAT are described by Greenwald et al. (1998) and
are summarized in Table 1.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. Two independent coders, blind to con-
dition, rated descriptions written in the suppression phase on
the extent to which they (a) reflected stereotypes of the profes-
sion being described, (b) specifically mentioned creativity, and
(c) specifically mentioned logic. Coders used 10-point scales (1
¼ not at all, 10¼ very much). Interrater reliability was satisfac-
tory for all dimensions (as¼ .78 to .86); thus ratings were aver-
aged. Participants in the suppression conditions produced
descriptions that were lower in overall stereotypicality and in
use of stereotypic traits (see Table 2).
Explicit self-concept. Average self-ratings on creativity- and
logic-related attributes were computed. Because participants
tended to view themselves as more logical than creative,
t(99) ¼ 3.33, p < .001, d ¼ .67, standardized scores were com-
puted and entered as repeated measures in an ANOVA with
suppression instructions and target group entered as between-
participants factors (see Figure 1, top and middle panels). A
two-way (instructions  group) ANOVA produced no signifi-
cant effects, largest F(1, 76) < 1, Zp
2 ¼ 0. Thus, participants’
explicit reports of their self-concept were not influenced by
recent suppression of a group stereotype.
Implicit self-concept. Preparation of response time data
derived from the IAT followed the steps outlined in Greenwald,
Nosek, and Banaji (2003).1 D scores were computed such that
more positive scores reflected stronger self-creativity associa-
tions (i.e., faster responses when ‘‘self’’ was paired with crea-
tivity) and more negative scores reflected stronger self-logic
Table 1. Overview of Implicit Association Test (Experiment 1)
Response categories Stimuli
Block Number of trials Left Right Left Right
1 20 Other Self Other pronouns: he, she, it, they, them Self pronouns: me, I, my, mine, self
2 20 Logical Creative Logical traits: logical, rational, reasonable,
sensible, calculating
Creative traits: creative, imaginative,
inventive, innovative, original
3 20 Other logical Self creative Other pronouns, logical traits Self pronouns, creative traits
4 40 Other logical Self creative Other pronouns, logical traits Self pronouns, creative traits
5 20 Creative Logical Creative traits Logical traits
6 20 Other creative Self logical Other pronouns, creative traits Self pronouns, logical traits
7 40 Other creative Self logical Other pronouns, creative traits Self pronouns, logical traits
Note: The order of Blocks 2-3-4 and 5-6-7 was counterbalanced. Order had no effect on results and is not discussed.
Table 2. Mean Ratings of Stereotypicality, Logic, and Creativity Used
During Suppression Phase, Experiment 1
Describe Suppress
M SD M SD
Stereotypicality ratings
Inventors 5.53 0.95a 2.73 0.98b
Mathematicians 5.73 0.80a 2.95 1.13b
Logic ratings
Inventors 1.90 0.64a 1.85 0.67a
Mathematicians 5.60 0.99b 1.80 0.44a
Creativity ratings
Inventors 4.68 1.10a 1.90 0.62b
Mathematicians 2.25 0.68b 2.25 0.64b
Note: Means within a section marked with different superscripts are different
at p < .01. Means marked with the same superscript are not significantly
different.
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associations (i.e., faster responses when ‘‘self’’ was paired with
logic). Because of the relative nature of the IAT, D scores were
standardized for analysis. Standardized D scores were analyzed
using a two-way ANOVA. This analysis produced a significant
main effect of group, F(1, 76) ¼ 4.08, p ¼ .05, Zp2 ¼ .05. Par-
ticipants exposed to inventors had higher self-creativity asso-
ciations (M ¼ 0.21, s ¼ 1.05) than those exposed to
mathematicians (M ¼ –0.22, s ¼ 0.97). However, this effect
was qualified by a significant interaction with suppression
instructions, F(1, 76) ¼ 10.76, p ¼ .001, Zp2 ¼ .12 (see
Figure 1, bottom panel).
Simple main effects confirmed that participants who sup-
pressed inventor stereotypes revealed stronger self-creativity
associations (M ¼ 0.58, s ¼ 0.79) than those who merely
described inventors (M ¼ –0.15, s ¼ 1.17), F(1, 76) ¼ 5.66,
p ¼ .02, Zp2 ¼ .07, whereas participants who suppressed math-
ematician stereotypes revealed stronger self-logic associations
(M ¼ –0.56, s ¼ 0.95) than those who merely described
mathematicians (M ¼ 0.12, s ¼ 0.89), F(1, 76) ¼ 5.11, p ¼
.03, Zp
2 ¼ .06.2
Summary. Participants’ implicit self-concepts were assimi-
lated to a previously suppressed stereotype, whereas their
explicit self-concepts were unaffected. These results suggest
that stereotype suppression provokes changes in the active
self-concept. Unsurprisingly, these changes were not observed
in explicit self-ratings, as such responses may reflect proposi-
tional knowledge about the self (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2006). They were instead observed in the implicit measure
(i.e., the IAT). The active-self account holds that concept
activation results in selective accessibility of relevant
self-knowledge, which is more likely reflected in implicit mea-
sures (e.g., the IAT). In the present research, stereotype sup-
pression increased the accessibility of elements of the self-
concept consistent with the suppressed stereotype.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that stereotype suppression
strengthens associations between stereotypic attributes and the
self. This raises the question of whether suppression may result
in similar changes in other self-relevant outcomes, such as
behavior in stereotype-relevant domains. No previous studies
have examined whether suppressing stereotypes of groups to
which one does not belong can result in stereotype-congruent
behavior. Indeed, prior research on stereotype suppression has
not typically included behavioral measures, instead limiting
investigations of suppression to its effects on judgment and
construct accessibility.
Research stemming from the active-self account has shown
that changes to the active self may be reflected in overt beha-
vior (see Wheeler et al., 2007). Evidence from the priming lit-
erature is again informative. Studies of concept priming have
established that activating traits or stereotypes often results in
changes to one’s behavior. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996)
found that trait- or stereotype-primed participants assimilated
their behavior toward the primed concept (rude-primed partici-
pants interrupted more quickly, elderly-primed participants
walked more slowly, African American–primed participants
reacted to provocation with more hostility). Since their
research, priming effects on social behavior, motor responses,
and intellectual performance have been reported (for a review,
see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). According to the active-self
account, behavioral effects of priming are an outward reflec-
tion of changes to the active self-concept.
Experiment 2 directly investigated the hypothesis that
stereotype suppression produces stereotype-congruent beha-
vior. Participants suppressed occupational stereotypes before
completing tasks on which those occupational groups would
be expected to excel. Following prior research (e.g., Dijkster-
huis et al., 1998) demonstrating that cognitive performance—
just as motor and social behavior—can be influenced by acces-
sible stereotypes, we expected participants who suppressed
occupational stereotypes to perform better on stereotype-
relevant cognitive tasks (but not stereotype-irrelevant tasks;
cf. Hansen & Wa¨nke, 2009).
Method
Participants. A total of 82 members of an urban U.K. commu-
nity (71% female, average age 22.8 years) took part in this and
an unrelated study in exchange for £3 ($4.50).3 Participants
were tested in groups of three to five.
Design. Suppression instructions (suppress vs. describe), tar-
get group (mathematicians vs. inventors), and task (creativity
1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Inventors Mathematicans
E
xp
lic
it 
Se
lf
 R
at
in
gs
(L
og
ic
)
Describe
Suppress
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Inventors Mathematicans
E
xp
lic
it 
Se
lf
 R
at
in
gs
 
(C
re
at
iv
ity
)
Describe
Suppress
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Inventors Mathematicans
Im
pl
ic
it 
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
ns
(L
og
ic
–C
re
at
iv
ity
) Describe
Suppress
Figure 1. Standardized trait ratings and Implicit Association Test
scores (Experiment 1).
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vs. logic) were manipulated in 2  2  2 mixed design where
the last factor varied within participants.
Procedure. The experiment involved two phases purported to
be unrelated studies, both carried out via computer to reduce
experimenter effects. The first (suppression) phase was identi-
cal to Experiment 1. After describing (and, for participants in
suppression conditions, suppressing stereotypes of) inventors
or mathematicians, participants completed two behavioral
measures: namely, a creativity task and a logic task (the order
of which was counterbalanced). The ‘‘Creative Uses Test’’
required participants to generate as many novel uses as possible
for each of four common household objects (a paper clip, a
brick, a shoe, and a sheet of paper). The ‘‘Logical Reasoning
Test’’ required participants to solve 10 problems drawn from
the GRE analytic section.4 Participants were allowed to com-
plete both tasks at their own pace. After completing the two
tasks, participants were debriefed and excused. Importantly,
no participant reported awareness of a connection between the
suppression task and the dependent measures.5
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. Two independent coders, blind to con-
dition, rated descriptions written in the suppression phase on
the dimensions of creativity, logic, and general stereotypicality.
Interrater reliability was satisfactory for all three dimensions
(as ¼ .80 to .87), and ratings were averaged. As summarized
in Table 3, participants in the suppression conditions produced
descriptions that were lower in overall stereotypicality and in
use of stereotypic traits.
Task performance. Creativity scores were defined as the total
number of uses generated for the four objects. Logic scores
were computed as the proportion of correct responses. To allow
for comparisons of performance across tasks (which were
characterized by different performance distributions), standar-
dized scores for both creativity and logic tasks were computed
and entered as repeated measures in an ANOVA where
instructions and target group were between-participants fac-
tors. This analysis produced a significant three-way interaction,
F(1, 68) ¼ 14.30, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .18 (see Figure 2). Separate
two-way ANOVAs were then carried out on each task. A sig-
nificant instruction  group interaction was obtained for crea-
tivity scores, F(1, 68) ¼ 11.02, p ¼ .001, Zp2 ¼ .14. Simple
main effects confirmed that suppression participants performed
significantly better in inventors, F(1, 68)¼ 34.69, p < .001, Zp2
¼ .34, than in the mathematician condition, F(1, 68) ¼ 1.43, p
¼ .24, Zp2 ¼ .02.6 Similarly, a significant instruction  group
interaction was obtained for logic scores, F(1, 68) ¼ 6.16, p ¼
.02, Zp
2 ¼ .08. Simple main effects showed that suppression
participants performed significantly better in the mathemati-
cian condition, F(1, 68) ¼ 8.05, p ¼ .006, Zp2 ¼ .11, but not
in the inventor condition, F(1, 68) < 1, p ¼ .50, Zp2 ¼ .01.7
Summary. This study shows, for the first time, that suppres-
sing stereotypes of groups to which one does not belong can
result in stereotype-congruent behavior. Participants who sup-
pressed inventor stereotypes became more creative (a trait
associated with inventors), and those who suppressed
mathematician stereotypes became more logical (an attribute
associated with mathematicians), compared to participants who
merely described those groups. Importantly, this pattern of
results reflects domain-specific boosts in performance. That
is, suppressing stereotypes of intelligent groups (inventors and
mathematicians) did not uniformly improve cognitive perfor-
mance. Rather, only performance in stereotype-relevant
domains benefited from suppression.
General Discussion
The experiments reported here demonstrate for the first time
that thought suppression influences two important self-
relevant outcomes: the implicit self-concept and overt beha-
vior. Participants in Experiment 1 revealed stronger associa-
tions between the self and stereotypic traits after suppressing
those stereotypes, indicating that their self-concept had shifted
to incorporate those traits. This finding implies that the active
self may assimilate to concepts activated through suppression.
Moreover, Experiment 2 established that changes in cognitive
performance occurred as the result of suppressing stereotypes
associated with performance domains. Participants became
more creative if they had suppressed stereotypes of inventors
but more logical if they had suppressed stereotypes of mathe-
maticians. To our knowledge, our experiments are the first to
provide direct evidence that stereotype suppression alters the
self-concept and behavior in stereotype-congruent ways.
Although our data do not allow us to make claims about the
process underlying these behavioral effects, they are consistent
with the active-self account’s proposal that behavior changes
following concept activation are mediated by changes to the
active self-concept.
Table 3. Mean Ratings of Stereotypicality, Logic, and Creativity Used
During Suppression Phase, Experiment 2
Describe Suppress
M SD M SD
Stereotypicality ratings
Inventors 6.03 0.65a 2.83 0.82b
Mathematicians 5.97 0.65a 3.28 1.00b
Logic ratings
Inventors 2.17 0.54a 2.22 0.57a
Mathematicians 4.22 0.69b 2.31 0.64a
Creativity ratings
Inventors 4.92 0.67a 2.11 0.65b
Mathematicians 2.44 0.70b 2.58 0.75b
Note: Means within a section marked with different superscripts are different
at p < .001. Means marked with the same superscript are not significantly
different.
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It is worth noting that our results are consistent with early
work on stereotype suppression. In Macrae et al.’s (1994)
research, stereotype suppression also influenced behavior. Par-
ticipants who suppressed skinhead stereotypes later distanced
themselves from the skinhead whom they had earlier described.
This finding was interpreted as evidence that suppression par-
ticipants judged the other person more stereotypically and were
motivated to avoid him. Yet the present studies suggest an
alternative interpretation—participants for whom skinhead
stereotypes were activated via suppression may have assimi-
lated skinhead-stereotypic traits (e.g., antisocial) to themselves,
and reflected this in their behavior. Although this interpretation
is necessarily post hoc, it raises interesting questions about
whether suppressing negative attributes would have parallel
effects as those found in these studies. Intuitively, individuals
may be less likely to assimilate negative qualities to them-
selves. However, there is ample evidence that people do in
fact shift their self-concepts and behavior toward accessible
negative attributes (Bargh et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg, 1998). Future research will need to confirm
whether suppressing negative stereotypes produces
stereotype-congruent shifts in self-concepts and behavior, but
we suggest that the current evidence is consistent with that
possibility.
Suppression, Priming, and the Active Self
Beside providing the first evidence of suppression effects on
self-relevant outcomes, these findings extend research on
thought suppression in a number of important ways. Although
previous studies established that rebound following suppres-
sion of personally intrusive thoughts may contribute to a vari-
ety of psychological disorders, the present studies are the first
to demonstrate that thought suppression influences self-
construal within normally functioning populations as well.
Moreover, they establish that suppressed concepts need not
be self-relevant to have consequences for self-relevant out-
comes. Suppressing stereotypes of groups that were unrelated
to themselves still led participants to assimilate their self-
concepts and behavior to those stereotypes. Finally, the present
results extend previous findings that stereotype suppression
biases construal of novel targets (typically depicted in an
ambiguous manner) to demonstrate that rebound effects also
bias construal of a target about whom a great deal is known
(i.e., the self).
One further aspect of the present results bears mention. In
contrast to previous research, merely thinking about a stereo-
typed group did not produce priming effects. In neither experi-
ment reported here did self-relevant outcomes assimilate to the
target group in the ‘‘describe’’ conditions. Only when partici-
pants suppressed stereotypes of those groups did changes to the
self emerge. In contrast, previous research (e.g., Dijksterhuis &
van Knippenberg, 1998; Haddock, Macrae, & Fleck, 2002) has
used ‘‘describe’’ instructions to successfully prime group
stereotypes. What might account for this difference? It is nota-
ble that participants in the ‘‘describe’’ conditions of the present
studies did not rely exclusively on stereotypes when generating
group descriptions. Stereotypicality ratings of descriptions pro-
duced during the suppression phase rarely surpassed the mid-
point of the scale. Thus, it is likely that participants in the
‘‘describe’’ conditions did not extensively process the stereo-
types in question. Only when required to specifically suppress
those stereotypes did they become sufficiently activated to
influence responses. Such findings are consistent with previous
stereotype suppression research. For example, Wyer et al.
(2000) found that the group (Asian American vs. African
American) described in the suppression phase of their studies
had no effect on subsequent judgments unless participants were
required to suppress stereotypes of that group.
Beyond establishing that stereotype suppression affects self-
relevant outcomes, these two experiments also extend the
active-self account beyond situations involving simple concept
priming. The active-self account (Wheeler et al., 2007) devel-
oped as a model of prime-to-behavior effects, which have been
demonstrated following both conscious and nonconscious
priming manipulations (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). How-
ever, studies typically cited in support of the active-self account
have tended to involve intentional processing of the primed
concept (e.g., DeMarree et al., 2005; Kawakami, Dovidio, &
Dijksterhuis, 2003). The present research demonstrates that
changes to the active self need not depend on intentional
processing. Rather, activating concepts using subtle or noncon-
scious means also produces changes to the active self. Indeed,
although thought suppression is by definition conscious and
controlled, its effects are neither intentional nor conscious, as
our assessment of participants’ awareness demonstrated.
Although the present experiments provide an important first
indication of how suppression influences self-construal, further
hypotheses may be derived from considering the priming liter-
ature. Recent priming research has established at least three
distinct effects on self-construal. Although the preponderance
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Figure 2. Performance (standardized) on logic and creativity tasks
(Experiment 2).
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of research has concerned assimilation effects (where the prime
produces stereotype-congruent changes), a significant body of
work suggests that—in some conditions—priming results in
contrast effects (where behavior changes in the opposite direc-
tion to the prime) or response effects (where behavior appropri-
ate to interacting with the primed target is produced). It is worth
considering whether (and when) postsuppression rebound
might lead to similar results.
We now know that priming produces contrast effects under
specific conditions. First, priming an exemplar (e.g., Einstein)
rather than a category (e.g., professors) results in self-
judgments and behaviors that are opposite to the prime (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). Furthermore, increasing self-focus
makes contrast more likely (Schubert & Ha¨fner, 2003). Both
of these factors are believed to encourage comparisons between
the self and the prime. Such comparisons result in assimilation
if the prime is construed as similar to the self but contrast if the
prime is construed as different from the self (see Mussweiler,
2007; Wheeler et al., 2007). One direction for future research
is to establish whether such comparisons occur when concepts
are activated after suppression. Although comparison itself
need not be conscious to produce contrast effects (e.g.,
Schubert & Ha¨fner, 2003), it is unclear whether the target of
comparison needs to be consciously processed. If so, suppres-
sion may produce contrast effects only after a delay (when the
suppressed concept returns to consciousness during rebound).
Fewer studies have examined response effects, which occur
when priming a target produces behavior that is compatible with
responding to that target. Such effects havebeenattributed to acti-
vation of interaction goals (Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006), sit-
uationmodels (Jonas & Sassenberg, 2006), or biased perceptions
of others in a social interaction (Smeesters, Warlop, van Aver-
maet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; see also Smeesters, Wheeler,
& Kay, 2009; Smeesters, Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Warlop, 2009).
Regardless of the mechanism responsible, response effects are
elicited by concept activation. Thus, suppression may produce
similar—or even intensified—response effects. Notably, such
effects are unlikely to be mediated by changes to self-construal
but rather by construal of the social situation and others present
in it. An important goal for research on both priming and suppres-
sion is to identify the conditions that promote each effect of con-
cept activation.
Although further research is needed to address these ques-
tions, the present work provides, for the first time, an important
demonstration that stereotype suppression has implications not
only for judgments of others but also for one’s own behavior
and self-perception.
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Notes
1. Split-half reliability was computed for Blocks 3-4 and Blocks 6-7.
Reliability was satisfactory (as ¼ .86 and .83).
2. Simple main effects of group were significant for the suppression
condition, F(1, 76) ¼ 14.05, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .16, but not the
describe condition, F(1, 76) < 1.
3. Data from 10 participants who failed to reach chance accuracy lev-
els on the logic task were excluded. Analyses are based on the
remaining 72 participants.
4. The two tasks were intentionally labeled as tests of creativity and
logic to minimize the possibility that effects of suppression could
be attributed to participants’ interpreting the tasks in terms of acti-
vated concepts (e.g., Kay, Wheeler, & Smeesters, 2008).
5. To establish that a behavioral effect is automatic, researchers
often rely on manipulations of concept activation that take place
outside of participants’ awareness. Suppression, by definition, is
a controlled and intentional process that operates within aware-
ness. Thus, it is important to note here that it is our contention
that the consequences of suppression are automatic and unin-
tended. Participants were unaware of how the manipulation
affected their performance. Moreover, suppression conditions are
compared against conditions where the target stereotype was
equally salient. If participants’ intentional and controlled reflec-
tion on those stereotypes had affected task performance, we
should have seen performance effects in our control conditions.
Yet differences in performance were observed only in the sup-
pression conditions.
6. Simple main effects of group were significant for the suppression
condition, F(1, 68) ¼ 18.95, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .22, but not the
describe condition, F(1, 68) < 1.
7. Simple main effects of group were significant for the describe con-
dition, F(1, 68) ¼ 4.61, p ¼ .04, Zp2 ¼ .06, but not the suppression
condition, F(1, 68) ¼ 1.86, p ¼ .18, Zp2 ¼ .03.
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